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Realizing Health Reform’s Potential 
The Essential Health Benefits Provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act: Implications for People 
with Disabilities
Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, and Katherine Hayes 
George Washington University
Abstract: In establishing minimum coverage standards for health insurance plans, the 
Affordable Care Act includes an “essential health benefits” statute that directs the U.S. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services not to make coverage decisions, determine reim-
bursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate 
against individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life. This issue 
brief examines how this statute will help Americans with disabilities, who currently are 
subject to discrimination by insurers based on health status and health care need. The 
authors also discuss the complex issues involved in implementing the essential benefits 
provision and offer recommendations to federal policymakers for ensuring that people 
with disabilities receive the full insurance benefits to which they are entitled.
                    
Overview
When fully implemented in January 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (Affordable Care Act) will transform the health insurance market for 
people with disabilities, enabling them to secure access to more affordable cover-
age. Beyond the threshold issue of access, however, lies an equally important ques-
tion: whether coverage will be appropriate to their health and health care needs or 
will leave them at risk for insufficient and ineffective care along with significant 
out-of-pocket financial exposure.
To avoid this, the Affordable Care Act breaks new ground by directly 
addressing the content of coverage through the concept of “essential health ben-
efits.” The law establishes an essential health benefits framework in two distinct 
markets. The first is the market for qualified health plans sold through state 
health insurance exchanges to individuals and small-employer groups. The second 
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is the general market for individual and small-group 
health plans, whether sold as qualified health plans 
through state health insurance exchanges or outside of 
the state exchange structure in what might be thought 
of as a parallel, state-regulated market.
 Whether sold inside or outside an exchange, 
plans sold in the individual and small-group markets 
will be regulated by the state within the same general 
rules, and will be available, if not marketed, to the 
same groups of individuals—namely those without 
employer-sponsored coverage and those who work 
for small employers. Embedded within this essential 
health benefits framework is a prohibition against cov-
erage discrimination based on disability. (While there 
are other prohibited grounds for discriminating in the 
essential benefits statute, we focus on disability in this 
issue brief, because disabling conditions are emblematic 
of the types of higher health cost risks that in turn trig-
ger insurers’ exclusionary coverage practices.) How this 
nondiscrimination framework advances prior federal 
laws and will be implemented as part of essential health 
benefits policy can be expected to emerge as a central 
issue in the implementation of the reform law.
This issue brief examines the Affordable Care 
Act’s essential health benefits statute and considers 
its provisions both separately and in relation to prior 
federal laws that address health insurance. We explore 
the concept of coverage discrimination and the various 
techniques of plan design and administration that can 
produce discriminatory effects against people with dis-
abilities. We then examine how the reform law’s essen-
tial benefits statute builds on existing federal laws that 
relate to health insurance and disability discrimination 
and discuss how implementation of the essential ben-
efits statute might be approached. 
THE ESSENTIAL BENEFITS STATUTE
When fully implemented in 2014, the Affordable Care 
Act will establish a range of reforms under various fed-
eral laws that are intended to make insurance coverage 
fairer and more accessible to individuals with height-
ened health needs. Among other things, the law will:
•	 prohibit discrimination in coverage based on 
health status—that is, prohibit plans from deny-
ing coverage to individuals, and from utilizing 
varying health insurance premiums, based on 
factors other than family size, region, age, or 
whether the individual participates in wellness 
programs;
•	 bar the use of preexisting condition exclusions; 
guarantee the renewability of coverage;
•	 bar lifetime and annual limits on coverage;
•	 establish medical-loss ratio standards;
•	 prohibit cost-sharing for certain preventive ser-
vices; and
•	 require coverage of routine patient costs associ-
ated with certain clinical trials.
These reforms alone will not ensure the 
adequacy of coverage in relation to health care need. 
Nor will they prevent insurers from designing cover-
age—including benefits, cost-sharing, and provider 
networks—in ways that attract and better serve health-
ier individuals with lower financial risks. Moreover, 
without provisions aimed at standardizing the con-
tent of coverage, it is very difficult for individuals and 
small-employer groups—the prime beneficiaries of the 
Affordable Care Act’s market reforms—to make mean-
ingful comparisons among coverage options. The need 
for some level of product standardization has long been 
recognized as a key element in making a health insur-
ance market work.
For this reason, the law also broadly defines 
what benefits need to be covered through policies 
offered in the individual and small-group markets. 
Under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) as 
amended by the Affordable Care Act, all insurers oper-
ating in the individual and small-group markets must 
cover an “essential health benefits” package.
The Affordable Care Act further directs that 
qualified health plans sold in state health insurance 
exchanges (including co-op plans) cover these essential 
health benefits.
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 The law also establishes cost-sharing limits 
with respect to the overall actuarial value of the plan, 
the total amount of cost-sharing to which individuals 
and families can be exposed, and the size of the annual 
deductible that must be met.
 Finally, it amends the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) to apply these provi-
sions, codified in the PHSA provisions to ERISA-
governed employer groups.
The act exempts large-group health plans, 
as well as self-insured ERISA plans and ERISA-
governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not 
subject to state insurance law, from the essential benefit 
requirements.
The term “essential health benefits” is defined 
as a series of broad benefit classes, with considerable 
discretion left to the Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to further 
define the concept (Exhibit 1). Qualified health plans 
are not barred from offering additional benefits, and 
states may require that qualified health plans sold in 
state health insurance exchanges also cover state-man-
dated benefits.
 Where a state mandate adds an entirely new 
benefit class to qualified health plans sold in exchanges, 
a state must pay the cost differential for coverage of 
these benefits.
 How treatments subsumed within an essential 
benefit class will be treated when applied to exchange 
products has not yet been determined.
Although the essential benefits statute vests 
discretion in the HHS secretary, the law also sets 
boundaries on how she exercises that discretion, shown 
in Exhibit 2 and excerpted below. These boundaries 
consist of certain elements related to public notice and 
comment, inclusion of treatments and services falling 
within the essential health benefits package, consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Labor on establishing cover-
age parameters based on a Department of Labor survey 
of “typical” employer plans, and a series of “required 
elements for consideration.”1
Specifically, the law states that the HHS sec-
retary must “ensure that such essential health benefits 
reflect an appropriate balance among the categories . . .  
so that benefits are not unduly weighted toward any 
category.”2 Second, the secretary may “not make cover-
age decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish 
incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that dis-
criminate against individuals because of their age, dis-
ability, or expected length of life.”3 Third, the secretary 
must take into account “the health care needs of diverse 
segments of the population, including women, children, 
persons with disabilities, and other groups.”4 Fourth, 
the secretary must ensure that essential benefits “not 
be subject to denial to individuals against their wishes 
Exhibit 1. Essential Benefit Classes Covered by Qualified Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act
•	 Ambulatory	patient	services
•	 Emergency	services
•	 Hospitalization
•	 Maternity	and	newborn	care
•	 Mental	health	and	substance	use	disorder	services
•	 Prescription	drugs
•	 Rehabilitative	and	habilitative	services	and	devices
•	 Laboratory	services
•	 Preventive	and	wellness	services
•	 Chronic	disease	management
•	 Pediatric	services,	including	oral	and	vision	care
Source:	Authors’	analysis	of	the	Affordable	Care	Act.
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on the basis of the individuals’ age or expected length 
of life or the individuals’ present or predicted disability, 
degree of medical dependency, or quality of life.”5
The essential health benefits definition also 
addresses cost-sharing, defined as “deductibles, coinsur-
ance, copayments or similar charges.”6 These provi-
sions address both the limits on annual cost-sharing as 
well as how these limits will be applied in relation to a 
four-tier cost-sharing coverage structure. This structure 
ranges from “bronze” plans (covering 60 percent of the 
full actuarial value of benefits provided) to “platinum” 
plans (covering 90 percent of the full actuarial value). 
(A fifth level of coverage pertaining to catastrophic 
plans may be sold to individuals under age 30 or others 
who are certified by the exchanges as not having access 
to affordable coverage, as defined in the statute.7) The 
concept of a plan’s actuarial value is defined as the level 
of coverage determined by the secretary based on the 
essential health benefits covered.8
The law also contains the following limitation 
on the HHS secretary’s discretion to define an essential 
benefits package: “Notwithstanding any other provision 
of the . . . Act, nothing . . . shall be construed to pro-
hibit (or authorize the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to promulgate regulations that prohibit) a 
group health plan or health insurance issuer from car-
rying out utilization management techniques that are 
commonly used as of the date of enactment of this 
Act.”9 The term “utilization management techniques” is 
not defined.
Taken together, the Affordable Care Act’s 
essential benefits provisions set out a multipronged 
decisional framework. First, they establish certain broad 
benefit classes that serve as anchors for the definition 
of an essential health benefits package. Second, they 
empower the HHS secretary, rather than health insur-
ers, to define the essential benefits package, in consul-
tation with the Labor secretary and on a nonreviewable 
basis (“as determined by the Secretary”). Third, the 
provisions peg the benefits to a “typical” employer plan 
while at the same time barring the HHS secretary from 
making coverage decisions, determining reimbursement 
rates, establishing incentive programs, or designing 
benefits in ways that discriminate on the basis of age, 
disability, or expected length of life. Finally, the law 
bars the secretary from prohibiting group health plans 
or health insurers from employing “utilization manage-
ment techniques” that are “commonly” used, while leav-
ing both terms undefined.
The essential health benefits framework raises 
important issues. To the extent that current “typical” 
coverage practices by group health plans discriminate 
on the basis of disability, the secretary nonetheless is 
obligated to ensure that such discriminatory practices 
are not carried over into the individual, small-employer 
group, and qualified health plan markets. But this pro-
vision raises the question of what “typical” employer 
practices consist of. Furthermore, how will the terms 
“coverage decisions,” “reimbursement rates,” “incentive 
programs,” and “benefit design” be defined in terms of 
the provision that bars the secretary from using such 
Exhibit 2. Parameters That Guide the HHS Secretary’s Determination of an Essential Benefits Package
Benefit classes:	Certain	classes	of	benefits	must	be	represented	in	the	essential	benefits	package.
Scope of benefits: Essential	health	benefits	must	be	equal	in	scope	to	benefits	provided	under	a	typical	employer	plan.
Certain elements must be considered:	Elements	that	must	be	considered	include:	the	balance	among	benefit	categories;	
nondiscrimination	against	individuals	because	of	their	age,	disability,	or	expected	length	of	life;	the	health	care	needs	of	
diverse	segments	of	the	population;	and	the	fact	that	benefits	cannot	be	subject	to	denial	on	the	basis	of	an	individual’s	
age	or	expected	length	of	life	or	the	individual’s	present	or	predicted	disability,	degree	of	medical	dependency,	or	quality	
of	life.
Cost-sharing:	The	law	includes	broad	limits	on	cost-sharing,	including	deductibles,	coinsurance,	copayments,	or	similar	
charges.
Utilization management:	The	HHS	secretary	cannot	prohibit	a	group	health	plan	or	health	insurance	issuer	from	carrying	
out	commonly	used	utilization	management	techniques.
Source:	Authors’	analysis	of	the	Affordable	Care	Act.
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tools in ways that would discriminate against people 
on the basis of age, disability, or expected length of life. 
Finally, what are the “utilization management” tech-
niques the secretary is barred from prohibiting?
COVERAGE DESIGN AND UTILIZATION 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE 
EMPLOYER GROUP MARKET
The starting point for determining how the essential 
health benefits package ultimately will be defined is the 
employer group market. It is thus useful to understand 
the techniques used by insurers operating in this mar-
ket to manage costs and thereby limit their exposure to 
the financial risks associated with claims for coverage. 
To the extent that these techniques result in disability 
discrimination, the Affordable Care Act’s essential 
benefits framework can be expected to curtail or mod-
ify these practices. 
Insurers’ strategies for managing risk are 
highly complex and extend well beyond simply offer-
ing a broader versus narrower range of benefit classes 
or instituting a prior authorization process for certain 
treatments. For example, how a particular benefit is 
defined may affect its availability in particular cases. 
Furthermore, within any covered benefit class there 
exist thousands of specific procedures that may or may 
not be covered.  For example, a prescription drug for-
mulary may exclude certain classes or types of drugs 
from coverage altogether. Provider networks may 
be designed to attract and enlist providers that treat 
lower-cost patients. Provider payment and incentive 
plans may encourage short-term treatment while dis-
couraging longer-term interventions. Key terms that 
govern the availability of all benefits, such as “medical 
necessity” or “experimental,” also can affect whether 
coverage is available for a particular condition. The use 
of certain types of exclusionary terms, such as “educa-
tional” or “social,” can bar otherwise-available coverage.
Because the Affordable Care Act specifies 
that the HHS secretary utilize the “typical” employee 
health benefits plan as the starting point for determin-
ing the scope of the essential health benefits package, it 
is important to understand how discrimination against 
people with disabilities and more advanced health 
needs can occur in such plans. In this context, the con-
cept of discrimination is meant to denote practices that 
limit insurers’ cost exposure in the case of members 
with high health care needs. Because the Affordable 
Care Act’s market reform provisions effectively bar 
discrimination at the point of enrollment, efforts to 
constrain costs at the point of coverage and use become 
all the more important to understand.10
Insurers’ approaches to managing risk include: 
1) techniques related to the design of benefits and 
coverage; and 2) techniques related to managing the 
utilization of covered benefits.11 Coverage and benefit 
design techniques can limit or exclude coverage out-
right, much in the way that an annual dollar limit on 
the value of coverage would place a hard limit on cov-
erage, regardless of need. Such techniques apply to all 
members enrolled in a particular plan and are intended 
to exclude certain types of coverage altogether, regard-
less of the characteristics of the individual who seeks 
care.12 In effect, design features act as fixed limitations 
and restrictions on the “amount, level, extent or nature 
of benefits or coverage for similarly situated individuals 
enrolled under the plan.”13 These types of limits can-
not be challenged with medical evidence showing that 
more or different treatments are necessary; coverage is 
not available regardless of the merits of the claim.
The second set of coverage risk management 
techniques relates to utilization management, that is, 
techniques used by health insurers to manage the use of 
covered benefits in the case of individual patients.14 In 
this regard, the Affordable Care Act requires the HHS 
secretary to recognize existing utilization management 
techniques in use at the time of passage, although such 
techniques presumably would be subject to the law’s 
broad nondiscrimination provisions.
The various types and range of coverage and 
benefit design limitation techniques, as well as utili-
zation management techniques, can be found in the 
health insurance literature.15 Another and perhaps even 
more useful source of evidence on these techniques is 
the large body of judicial case law involving appeals of 
benefit denials under ERISA and other laws govern-
ing health insurance and employee health benefits.16 
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Because the judicial record is comprehensive and pub-
lic, it is possible to view with particularity the specific 
risk-avoidance techniques used by group health plans. 
While these cases do not shed light on the frequency 
with which certain types of claims are denied, the deci-
sions provide understanding of the design and manage-
ment techniques that are available to group health plans. 
Benefit and Coverage Design Limitation 
Techniques
One of the largest trends in care and cost management 
in recent years has been the use of benefit and cover-
age design to manage risk. Initially, in the late 1980s, 
insurers testing cost-containment strategies tended to 
use broadly crafted coverage documents coupled with 
individual patient management, such as prospective 
and concurrent utilization management procedures.17 
Eventually, this approach proved to be ineffective at 
containing costs. As a result, over the past two decades, 
far greater attention has been focused on the design 
of the plan documents that describe what is covered 
in order to tighten the coverage criteria and thereby 
exclude certain types of treatments and procedures. 
Design strategies also utilize financial techniques such 
as patient cost-sharing and payment incentives aimed 
at encouraging more efficient practices and care-seek-
ing behavior.18
What sets plan design cost containment apart 
from utilization management efforts is that the denial 
of coverage is based on a specific limitation or exclu-
sion that is not specific to an individual’s health condi-
tion or treatment needs, and thus cannot be challenged. 
Under traditional employee health benefit plan prin-
ciples and in the absence of specific legal requirements, 
employers that sponsor health plans are considered 
to have unlimited discretion to exclude coverage. By 
contrast, in cases involving patient-specific utilization 
management denials, the claim denial rests on a deter-
mination that a particular benefit is not necessary for a 
particular patient. The latter decision rests on medical 
evidence and factual issues at play, giving rise to appeals 
rights. But where a claim denial is based on an admin-
istrator’s assertion that a particular benefit is excluded 
altogether under the terms of a plan, the result is total 
exclusion regardless of individual circumstances, and no 
appeal can be mounted.19
Coverage	exclusions	and	limitations. A 
claim denial can stem from an across-the-board cover-
age exclusion, embedded in the plan document, that 
excludes specific services and procedures in all cases. 
Exclusions can be expressed in durational or quan-
tity limits (e.g., no more than 30 speech therapy ses-
sions) or be tied to specific procedures or treatments. 
For example, prior to passage of the Women’s Cancer 
Recovery Act of 1998, breast reconstruction following 
mastectomy was considered cosmetic and was routinely 
and explicitly excluded from coverage.20
Exclusions also can be condition- or diagnosis-
based. For example, otherwise-covered speech and 
physical therapy might be excluded in cases in which 
the purpose of the treatment is to recover lost function-
ing or restore previous levels of functioning. In such a 
situation the “recover” limitation is embedded in the 
coverage definition itself (e.g., “speech therapy when 
needed to restore prior functioning”) or in a broader 
medical necessity definition that defines medical neces-
sity as existing only when a treatment has the potential 
to aid in recovery.21 
In addition, coverage exclusions can be pur-
pose-based. For example, an exclusion may be applied 
against coverage of otherwise-covered physical therapy 
where the insurer determines that the purpose of the 
therapy goes beyond clinical value and also will aid 
in broader health goals such as education or social 
and job-based functioning. This type of exclusion is 
sometimes applied when a child with developmental 
disabilities present at birth is receiving treatment that 
has clinical value as well as the added value of allow-
ing the child to develop speaking and movement skills 
that ultimately can be expected to result in an overall 
improvement in health and functioning.22 In those 
cases, an insurer may deny coverage because the therapy 
has an educational benefit, as well as a clinical benefit.
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Coverage	and	treatment	guidelines	
incorporated	into	the	plan’s	terms	of	coverage. 
Health plans make extensive use of benefit and clini-
cal guidelines to inform coverage decision-making. In 
some cases, the guidelines are used by an insurer to 
guide decisions but are not part of the plan documents 
themselves and thus do not bind a plan administrator 
to award or deny a benefit based on individual circum-
stances. In other cases, however, guidelines are incorpo-
rated into the plan documents as part of the coverage 
terms and thus create express limits on the types of 
treatments that can be covered. The guidelines express 
the full breadth and scope of treatment under the terms 
of the plan.23 For example, medical management guide-
lines might specify coverage of long-term treatment 
for alcohol addiction only in situations in which short-
term treatments have failed—thus barring the use of 
longer-term treatments even in situations in which a 
short-term treatment is clinically inappropriate, given a 
patient’s underlying health condition.24
Definitions	of	key	benefit	and	coverage	
terms. How plan documents define benefit classes can 
determine whether coverage is available. For example, 
where a plan’s terms define speech therapy as therapy 
needed to recover lost speech or restore speech, the 
effect is to exclude coverage for a child or adult whose 
health condition can benefit from therapy but for 
whom prior functioning cannot be “restored.” This type 
of example has particular resonance for children born 
with developmental disabilities and who need therapy 
to attain speech, or adults with muscular dystrophy 
who need therapy to maintain speech or avert the loss 
or deterioration of speech.25 In both cases, the therapy 
is clinically indicated as an effective health interven-
tion, but coverage is excluded because the intervention 
in the patient’s case falls outside the terms of coverage. 
In a similar vein are medical necessity defini-
tions that apply to all covered treatments and pro-
cedures and that limit coverage to services that are 
required for the treatment of “illness, injury, diseased 
condition, or impairment.”26 Such a framework may 
exclude some conditions. For example, a “diseased  
condition” as a concept could be construed narrowly  
to exclude physical and mental health conditions that 
are not considered by clinical experts to be the product 
of a disease but are instead determined to be present  
at birth.
Tiered	cost-sharing. Creating different lev-
els, or tiers, of cost-sharing has gained popularity as 
a way to provide incentives for the appropriate use of 
care.27 In tiered cost-sharing arrangements, higher-cost 
treatments and services (e.g., brand-name prescrip-
tion drugs, a specific type of operation performed 
by an out-of-network surgeon) are subject to higher 
cost-sharing when, in the health plan’s determination, 
a lower-cost treatment or in-network provider would 
provide equally effective treatment.28  Similarly, cost-
sharing may be reduced in cases in which adherence to 
a particular course of treatment (e.g., use of prescrip-
tion drugs to control blood pressure) is consistent with 
sound clinical practice and good health outcomes. 
Tiering decisions may be made on a case-by-
case basis or may be subject to practice guidelines that 
are embedded in plan documents and coverage terms 
and therefore automatically place certain treatments 
and procedures on a higher tier.29 Where the tiered 
arrangement is the result of a medical management 
decision specific to a particular patient, modification to 
consider whether the guidelines appropriately address 
To	the	extent	that	current	
“typical”	coverage	practices	by	group	
health	plans	discriminate	on	the	
basis	of	disability,	the	HHS	secretary	
nonetheless	is	obligated	to	ensure	
that	such	discriminatory	practices	are	
not	carried	over	into	the	individual,	
small	employer	group,	and	qualified	
health	plan	markets.
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that patient’s underlying condition may be possible. 
But where the tiered arrangement is the result of a 
guideline that is directly embedded into the terms of 
coverage, challenges are generally not possible.30
Tiered	provider	networks.31 Early efforts 
by health plans to encourage patients to use efficient, 
high-quality providers involved a total exclusion of 
certain providers from networks, leaving patients 
completely uncovered for out-of-network care. In 
recent years, group health plans have moved to a more 
nuanced, value-based approach that involves the use 
of provider tiers. Providers who have been shown to 
have higher costs and/or worse outcomes, as measured 
by a health plan, may be subject to higher cost-sharing 
or excluded altogether. The lowest cost-sharing levels 
are required for health professionals who deliver high 
value. Depending on the methodology used to compare 
providers, tiering may or may not take into account 
whether providers treat patients with more extensive 
health needs and thus utilize more resources either in 
their own practices or through specialty care referral 
patterns. Furthermore, tiers may be determined based 
on practice measures that are designed for populations 
with health conditions (e.g., diabetes), but without 
considering patients whose health conditions are made 
more complex by the presence of underlying disabling 
conditions (e.g., diabetes and schizophrenia).32
Provider	payments. Health plans give pro-
viders several different types of incentives to be parsi-
monious in their use of resources.33 Incentives may take 
the form of a year-end bonus or a shared-savings plan. 
Incentive payments may be tied to a provider’s overall 
consumption of resources and benefits (e.g., laboratory 
tests), and providers may be benchmarked against one 
another without taking into account their patient mix. 
Providers may be offered bonuses or case management 
fees to actively manage complex patients. To determine 
such incentive payments, health plans might compare 
the costs and outcomes for actual patients or, alterna-
tively, might compare costs and outcomes for a pro-
vider’s patient panel against established and normative 
benchmarks that may or may not reflect the actual 
health status of the provider’s patients. 
Utilization Management Techniques
Prospective	and	concurrent	review. Health plans 
have used prospective and concurrent review to con-
trol costs for decades. These processes are designed to 
control unnecessary utilization of covered but costly 
resources through advance or concurrent consideration 
of the medical necessity of the treatment or service 
under review. Central to the review process are: the 
substantive standards to assess the need for care; the 
strength of the clinical evidence considered; the appli-
cation of clinical decision-making guidelines to par-
ticular treatments, as well as the quality and relevance 
of the guidelines to the case at hand; and the extent to 
which the reviewer takes into account the clinical evi-
dence that is presented in relation to the case at hand.34
Care	coordination	and	care	management. 
An insurer or health plan may offer or require case 
management for certain types of conditions. In some 
cases, the service may be offered in addition to other 
covered services. Patients with particular conditions 
may be offered additional treatments and counseling, 
and their health and course of treatment may be closely 
monitored to measure improvement. In other cases, a 
disease management protocol may take on the qualities 
of an embedded practice guideline that restricts cover-
age to certain predefined treatments and charges higher 
cost-sharing for certain treatments. When imple-
mented in this fashion, care management may operate 
The	Affordable	Care	Act’s	
essential	benefit	nondiscrimination	
provisions	add	new	dimensions	to	
prior	federal	laws	regulating	insurance	
and	health	plans	and	barring	
discrimination.
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as an exclusive form of coverage for a particular illness 
or condition rather than as a process for tailoring cov-
ered benefits to individual needs.35
HOW THE NONDISCRIMINATION 
PROVISIONS EXTEND EXISTING LAW
The Affordable Care Act’s essential benefits nondis-
crimination provisions break new ground in how to 
think about these common techniques of health benefit 
design and management—adding new dimensions to 
prior federal laws regulating insurance and health plans 
and barring discrimination. The nondiscrimination 
provisions have no real parallel in state insurance laws, 
which do not address discrimination in the content of 
coverage but instead tend to mandate specific treat-
ments and procedures that otherwise were at risk for 
exclusion. For example, no state’s insurance laws bar the 
use of a “recover” or “restore” medical necessity standard 
in the group health market, but as of 2010, 23 states 
have laws that require coverage for certain types of 
habilitation treatments aimed at promoting the overall 
health of children with autism.36 
Although the nondiscrimination provisions 
are unprecedented in the context of coverage content, a 
number of federal laws offer important precedents. 
Federal Laws Regulating Insurance and 
Employee Health Benefit Plans
HIPAA. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provided the 
foundation for the Affordable Care Act’s market 
reforms.37 HIPAA was the first major attempt to use 
federal law to prevent insurers from discriminating 
against people with health conditions and disabili-
ties. Amending the PHSA, ERISA, and the Internal 
Revenue Code in order to reach both state-regulated 
health insurance and self-insured health benefit plans, 
HIPAA bars discrimination based on health status at 
the point of enrollment and renewal. In effect, the new 
reform law builds on the HIPAA precedent, extend-
ing nondiscrimination prohibitions into the individual 
market and strengthening existing provisions in the 
group market. But unlike the reform law, HIPAA does 
not address the problem of discrimination in the design 
and administration of coverage because it does not 
address the content of insurance itself.
ERISA.	Other than having to abide by the 
HIPAA provisions, ERISA generally accords employ-
ers broad discretion in health benefit plan design and 
administration, regardless of whether the plan is fully 
insured (and thus also subject to applicable state laws) 
or self-insured (and thus exempt from state laws regu-
lating insurance).38 Thus, for example, although ERISA 
contains provisions barring discrimination against 
participants or beneficiaries who exercise their right 
to benefits, this prohibition has been held not to bar a 
group health plan from singling out a specific disability 
for express limitation or exclusion from coverage.39 
There are important exceptions, however. 
For example, ERISA requires that certain individuals 
experiencing a “qualifying event,” including illness and 
job loss, be permitted to continue to buy group health 
coverage under their ERISA plans (a right popularly 
known as “COBRA”).40 ERISA also bars exclusion 
from coverage of college students on a medically neces-
sary leave of absence.41 
Furthermore, ERISA has been amended to bar 
discrimination against certain types of patients in terms 
of the content of coverage. For example, ERISA pro-
hibits group health plans from excluding coverage for 
reconstructive surgery to women with breast cancer or 
from covering only minimal hospital stays for pregnant 
women and newborns.42 Perhaps most important in the 
context of discrimination, ERISA bars discrimination 
in coverage in the case of individuals with mental ill-
ness or substance use disorders, as discussed below.
GINA.	The Genetic Non-Discrimination Act 
of 2008 (GINA) bars certain employer and insurer 
practices related to the use of genetic information, but 
nothing in GINA directly addresses content restric-
tions that might reduce or eliminate coverage for cer-
tain individuals with conditions tied to genetic traits.43
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Mental	health	and	substance	use	disor-
der	parity. Mental health parity represents the most 
important law enacted to date that directly addresses 
discrimination in the design and administration of 
state-regulated health insurance and ERISA-governed 
employer-sponsored health benefit plans. The Mental 
Health Parity Act of 1996, revised and expanded by 
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, broadly 
addresses the problem of discrimination against mental 
illness and addiction disorders in both benefit design 
and plan administration.44  
The original legislation addressed parity only 
in relation to annual and lifetime dollar limits on cov-
erage; the 2008 amendments extend the concept of 
parity to reach a broad range of coverage limitations 
and exclusions. These amendments were further refined 
in implementing regulations released in 2010 by the 
Departments of Labor, Treasury, and HHS, which 
define parity in terms of quantitative treatment limits 
(i.e., the number of visits permitted) as well as “non-
quantitative” treatment limits that “otherwise limit the 
scope or duration of benefits for treatment.”45 These 
types of limits lie at the heart of modern benefit design 
and medical management systems; in particular, non-
quantitative design and management techniques, which 
in some cases are expressly designed to constrain cover-
age to individuals with disabilities.
The 2010 parity regulations affect many of 
the health benefit design and management practices 
described above. For example, the regulations specify 
that discrimination may be present under the par-
ity law when mental illness and addiction disorders 
are singled out by guidelines that restrict coverage to 
certain treatments, regardless of the medical evidence, 
even when no similar absolute limits apply to other 
conditions. The rules also clarify that parity can be vio-
lated through discriminatory medical necessity criteria 
that utilize more restrictive tests of necessity in the case 
of mental illness and through other design techniques 
such as tiered cost-sharing, tiered network arrange-
ments, and utilization management procedures that are 
applied in a discriminatory fashion.46 
The parity provisions thus offer an important 
precedent in approaching the essential benefits provi-
sions of the Affordable Care Act. In the case of mental 
health parity, the federal agencies not only have directly 
addressed the range of plan design and administration 
practices, but have identified many types of practices 
that must be held to nondiscrimination standards, 
including specific benefit definitions, broad definitional 
terms such as medical necessity, the use of practice 
guidelines, and the use of provider network and cost-
sharing tiers. These strategies are grouped together 
as nonquantitative in nature and set the framework 
of coverage itself, as well as how that coverage will be 
administered. 
Civil Rights Laws 
The Affordable Care Act directly incorporates numer-
ous civil rights laws into Title I.47 Specifically, it pro-
vides that:
An individual shall not, on the ground pro-
hibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, or 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity, any part of which 
is receiving federal financial assistance, includ-
ing credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, 
or any program or activity that is administered 
by an Executive Agency or any entity estab-
lished under this title.48
The provision thus incorporates federal civil 
rights laws applicable to federally assisted programs 
while also clarifying that these laws reach federally 
subsidized contracts of insurance such as qualified 
health plans that receive federal premium tax credits. 
By incorporating these laws into the Affordable Care 
Act, the general nondiscrimination provision further 
strengthens the core essential health benefit nondis-
crimination statute but does not duplicate it, since civil 
rights laws barring discrimination against people with 
disabilities have been held not to reach the content of 
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coverage itself.49 Preexisting nondiscrimination laws 
might be expected to reach insurance and health plan 
practices inside exchanges such as: sales, outreach, 
and marketing practices; the selection and deselection 
of health care providers; the accessibility of care and 
appeals procedures; and other issues related to access to 
covered benefits. But it is the essential benefits nondis-
crimination provisions that affect the actual content of 
benefits and do so both in exchange markets as well as 
in the parallel market for individual and small-group 
products. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s essential 
benefits provisions and its prohibition against discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities will raise a 
number of complex issues.
Defining Key Terms
An important first step of the implementation process 
is for the HHS secretary to define key terms in the 
essential benefits provisions. In addition to needing to 
define the scope of each class of essential benefits, the 
secretary must define such terms as “disability,” “cover-
age decisions,” “reimbursement rates,” “incentive pro-
grams,” and “benefit design.” Also to be further defined 
in designing the essential benefits package is how the 
secretary will “take into account” the health care needs 
of diverse populations, including people with disabili-
ties. Furthermore, the secretary must define the law’s 
prohibition against the denial of essential benefits 
based on individuals’ “age or expected length of life” 
or “present or predicted disability, degree of medical 
dependency, or quality of life.” In defining key terms, 
the secretary presumably will look to existing laws and 
relevant industry practices. For example, existing laws 
related to coverage decisions made by group health 
plans or Medicare provide guidance on how clinical 
evidence should be weighed.
The single most important definitional matter 
may be the threshold question of whether prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of disability reaches both 
intentional discrimination as well as de facto discrimi-
nation—practices that are neutral on their face but 
discriminatory in their impact. Because the Affordable 
Care Act specifically incorporates existing disability 
law, and because existing law reaches both intentional 
and de facto discrimination, the essential benefits non-
discrimination provisions should be interpreted in a 
fashion that parallels existing disability law. This means 
that the provisions should be interpreted as reach-
ing not only intentional practices (such as a coverage 
standard that specifies the need for “recovery” before a 
claim will be allowed) but also de facto practices such 
as the use of facially neutral provider payment incen-
tives that nonetheless discriminate because they are 
applied without consideration of a provider’s underly-
ing patients. For example, plans would no longer be 
permitted to intentionally exclude providers that have 
a special expertise in, and a disproportionate share of, 
patients with disabilities. In designing the nondis-
crimination aspect of the essential benefits provisions, 
Congress clearly intended to reach matters of both plan 
design and administration practices, in order to ensure 
that plans do not discriminate by either intentional 
design or practical effect. 
Plan Design and Administration Practices
The nondiscrimination provisions require that the 
HHS secretary set the parameters under which insurers 
may operate in matters of both design and administra-
tion, including benefit design, coverage decisions, reim-
bursement rates, and incentive programs. The sweeping 
language of the nondiscrimination provision means 
that, as with the mental health parity rules, the secre-
tary must address certain risk-avoidance techniques 
and strategies. 
Exclusionary	coverage	terms.	Health insur-
ers and qualified health plans should be expected to 
adhere to nondiscriminatory coverage terms in order to 
avoid excluding otherwise covered treatments simply 
on the basis of a patient’s underlying condition. The 
decision of whether a particular treatment or service is 
covered should turn solely on whether it is appropriate 
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to a patient’s health condition—not whether it will 
enable restoration or recovery or have effects that tran-
scend the purely clinical and go to overall health and 
ability to function. In the case of children and adults 
with disabilities, many treatments within the essential 
benefits classes are clinically justified not because they 
allow restoration or recovery but because they enable 
patients to attain good health, maintain their health, or 
avert the loss of functioning that could lead to a dete-
rioration in health. 
Excluding	coverage	for	treatments	that	
show	both	clinical	and	health	benefits. The 
fact that a treatment may confer both clinical and 
broader health benefits should be irrelevant in decid-
ing whether it is appropriate. Exclusions based on the 
broader health benefits conferred by a clinical interven-
tion (such as the ability to learn, work, or engage in 
social activities) are enhancements of the clinical effects 
of treatments, not reasons to deny them. 
Guidelines	and	coverage	design	and	deci-
sion-making.	Benefit and treatment guidelines are a 
staple in health plan design and plan administration, 
serving two purposes: 1) to set out coverage limits for 
certain conditions or for one or more benefit classes; 
and 2) to use as a nonbinding tool to aid coverage deci-
sion-making in specific cases. In both situations, the 
impact of the guideline may be to foreclose potentially 
covered treatments within an essential benefit class 
at a level and scope necessary to achieve an appropri-
ate health result. Guidelines that contain restrictions 
based on whether treatments are intended to help in 
“recovery or restoration” would appear to fail under a 
nondiscrimination test, for the same reason that such 
limits are contrary to a nondiscrimination test when 
they appear as limitations in the coverage definitional 
sections of an insurance plan. Further, guidelines that 
place fixed limits on treatments may be inappropri-
ate in situations in which the condition to which the 
guideline is applied is further complicated by the pres-
ence of an underlying disability. Thus the manage-
ment of asthma, for example, may vary depending on 
whether the patient also has an underlying condition 
such as major depression or diabetes. 
Regardless of whether benefit and treatment 
guidelines are used to set binding coverage limits or 
merely to guide treatment decision-making, the ques-
tion is whether the nondiscrimination provision in the 
essential benefits statute bars the use of the guideline 
to limit treatment when the effect of the guideline is to 
discriminate against certain health conditions. Such an 
exception is similar to the one that applies to coverage 
of outpatient prescription drugs under Medicare Part 
D, which permits individuals to appeal coverage deni-
als on the ground of documented health care need and 
to submit evidence demonstrating the utility of treat-
ments for a particular condition.50
Across-the-board	coverage	limitations	
and	exclusions. Nothing in the Affordable Care Act 
prohibits the use of across-the-board limitations on 
coverage. While strict limits on the amount or duration 
of benefits work particular hardships on individuals 
with disabilities, the question is whether such limits 
are discriminatory. As long as the limits apply to all 
conditions and all treatments, discrimination per se is 
not the issue. However, the essential benefits statute 
requires the HHS secretary to consider the needs of 
people with disabilities in designing benefits and mak-
ing coverage determinations. This might argue for an 
exceptions process to permit greater levels of coverage 
in cases in which relevant and reliable evidence dem-
onstrate the health benefits of a treatment. Further, 
while across-the-board limitations and exclusions on 
an entire benefit class might not be discriminatory, 
exclusions that single out specific treatments used only 
for specific disabling conditions should be considered a 
form of discrimination. 
Tiered	cost-sharing	and	provider	net-
works.	Tiered cost-sharing and provider networks are 
increasingly common design features in health benefit 
plans. The use of tiering raises the question of the 
need for an evidence-based exception to plan design in 
cases where a tier would otherwise result in the denial 
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of appropriate treatment based on a health condition 
or where a specific provider should be treated as an 
in-network provider (with in-network payment rates 
and cost-sharing) in order to ensure the appropriate 
management of disabling conditions. In essence, the 
question is whether the nondiscrimination provision 
applicable to essential health benefits, when coupled 
with existing civil rights protections, requires that 
health plans modify provider network selection and 
tiering practices in order to protect against the threat of 
discrimination in access to equally effective care. 
Provider	payment	and	incentive	arrange-
ments.	Existing laws aimed at curbing health care 
fraud and abuse prohibit incentive arrangements that 
induce health professionals to deny or withhold medi-
cally necessary treatment.51 However, payment and 
incentive arrangements should not be benchmarked 
against normative performance with a healthy patient 
panel, but instead should be risk-adjusted to take 
into account patients with disabilities. As with tiered 
cost-sharing and provider networks, this consideration 
reflects not only the essential benefit nondiscrimination 
provision but also federal civil rights laws that require 
access to equally effective health care. 
Utilization	management	techniques.	In 
addition to addressing the problem of discrimination in 
all aspects of benefit and coverage design and practice, 
it is important to address potentially discriminatory 
utilization management processes. The Affordable 
Care Act preserves existing utilization management 
practices but does so under the broader nondiscrimina-
tion provisions of the essential benefits statute. As such, 
and as with the mental health parity regulations, medi-
cal management techniques that differentiate based 
on the nature of the condition or disability should be 
prohibited. Further, the nondiscrimination prohibition 
should be extended to the claims appeals process appli-
cable to essential benefits plans in order to ensure that 
evidence specific to an individual’s condition and treat-
ment is always taken into account as part of the record.
Finally, of course, for the nondiscrimination 
statute to be meaningful, compliance must be mea-
sured and the terms of the law must be enforced. This 
means assurance that the nondiscrimination provisions 
and implementing standards are incorporated into and 
applied to all state insurance contracts governed by the 
essential benefits statute. In this way, the requirements 
of federal law will become an inherent part of the 
documents that create the plan and define the rights of 
covered individuals. Further, government enforcement 
standards developed for oversight of the individual and 
small-group market, as well as the exchange qualified 
health plan market, should be structured to measure 
plan adherence to nondiscrimination standards. This 
structure will necessitate a review of plan documents 
and coverage terms, as well as an assessment of plans’ 
coverage determination, incentives, and payment 
practices.
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